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Abstract
The review presents the basics of quantum decision theory, with the emphasis on
temporary processes in decision making. The aim is to explain the principal points of
the theory. The difference of an operationally testable rational choice between alter-
natives from a choice decorated by irrational feelings is elucidated. Quantum-classical
correspondence is emphasized. A model of quantum intelligence network is described.
Dynamic inconsistencies are shown to be resolved in the frame of the quantum decision
theory.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, there has appeared high interest to the possibility of formulating decision
theory in the language of quantum mechanics. Numerous references on this topic can be
found in the books [1–4] and review articles [5–8]. This interest is caused by the inability
of classical decision theory [9] to comply with the behaviour of real decision makers, which
requires to develop other approaches. Resorting to the techniques of quantum theory gives
hopes for a better representation of behavioral decision making. There are several variants
of using quantum mechanics for interpreting conscious effects. The aim of the present review
is not the description of the existing variants, which would need too much space and can be
found in the cited literature [1–8], but a survey of the approach suggested by the author and
his coworkers. This approach was coined [10] Quantum Decision Theory (QDT).
In the present review, we limit ourselves by considering quantum decision theory, but
we do not touch other trends in the ramified applications of quantum techniques, such as
quantum approaches in physics, chemistry, biology, economics and finances, in quantum
information processing, quantum computing, and quantum games. It looks evident that all
those fields cannot be reasonably described in a single review.
Although the theory of quantum games shares similarities with decision theory, however
there exists an important difference between the standard treatment of quantum games
[11–15] and the main idea of quantum decision theory presented in the review. In the
theory of quantum games, one usually assumes that players are a kind of quantum devices
following quantum rules [16, 17]. However in the approach of quantum decision theory [10],
decision makers do not have to be quantum devices, moreover, they can be real human
beings. The mathematics of QDT is analogous to the mathematics in the theory of quantum
measurements, where an observer is a classical human being, while the observed processes are
characterized by quantum laws. In QDT, quantum theory is a technical language allowing for
the description of decision processes. Quantum techniques turn out to be a very convenient
tool for characterizing realistic human decision processes incorporating rational-irrational
duality, because quantum techniques are designed for taking into account the dual nature
of quantum world, such as the particle-wave duality. The mathematical generalization of
decision-making processes by including into them the rational-irrational duality is one of the
main achievements of QDT. Summarizing, the specific features of QDT, distinguishing it
from many variants of decision theory employing quantum techniques, are as follows.
(i) The mathematics of QDT is analogous to that used for characterizing quantum mea-
surements, so that there is a direct correspondence between QDT and the theory of quantum
measurements. (ii) The approach is general not only in the description of both decision the-
ory and quantum measurements, but also in its mathematical formulation allowing for the
interpretation of various decision events or quantum measurements. (iii) The theory shows
the difference between the decision making with respect to operationally testable events and
the choice under uncertainty caused by irrational subconscious feelings. (iv) Single decision
makings as well as successive decision makings are described on equal footing. (v) Tem-
poral evolution of decision processes is formulated. (vi) Quantum-classical correspondence
is preserved explaining the relation between quantum and classical probabilities. (vii) No
paradoxes of classical decision theory arise. (viii) Different dynamic decision inconsistencies
find natural explanation in the frame of QDT. (ix) The theory can be applied to single
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decision makers and also to decision-maker societies forming quantum intelligence networks.
Of course, not all above mentioned aspects will and can be considered in detail in the
present review. To describe all of them would require a huge book. We shall concentrate
on the principal points the theory is based on and will emphasize temporal effects that have
not been sufficiently discussed in the previous publications. In order to make for the reader
clear the basic ideas of the QDT, it is useful to present the foundations in several steps.
First, we need to define the process of decision making in the case of operationally testable
events. This introduces the way of calculating quantum probabilities in the case of projection
valued measures. Then it is straightforward to generalize the consideration to dual processes,
when a decision is made by taking into account rational as well as irrational sides, which
involves the use of positive operator-valued measures. Next, the approach to describing a
society of decision makers, forming a quantum intelligence network, is presented. Finally,
several dynamic decision inconsistencies are considered as an illustration of how they can be
naturally resolved in the frame of QDT.
2 Operationally Testable Events
The mathematics of QDT is similar to that employed for treating quantum measurements.
Therefore each formula can be interpreted from two sides, from the point of view of quantum
measurements or decision theory [10, 18–20]. Below as a rule we follow the interpretation
related to decision theory, only occasionally mentioning quantum measurements. Some parts
of the scheme below can be familiar to quantum mechanics, but here we suggest the interpre-
tation in the language of decision theory, which is needed for introducing the basic notions
of QDT. These basic notions are introduced step by step in order to better demonstrate
the logic of the QDT. We will not plunge into the details of numerous applications that
can be found in the published literature. The main aim of this review is the explanation of
the principal points of the approach, with the emphasis on the evolutionary side of decision
processes.
The typical illustration of decision making is based on the choice between given alterna-
tives, say forming a set {An}, enumerated by the index n = 1, 2, . . . , NA. The alternatives
correspond to events that can be operationally tested. Each alternative is represented by a
vector |An〉, where the bra-cket notation [21] is used. The vectors of alternatives pertain to
a Hilbert space of alternatives
HA = span { | n 〉 } , (1)
being a closed linear envelope over an orthonormal basis. Decisions are taken by a subject
whose mind is represented by a Hilbert space
HS = span { | α 〉 } (2)
that can be called the subject space of mind, or just the subject space. Thus the total space,
where decisions are made, is the decision space
H = HA
⊗
HS . (3)
This is a closed linear envelope over an orthonormal basis,
H = span { | nα 〉 ≡ | n 〉 ⊗ | α 〉 } .
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The alternatives from the given set, represented by vectors |An〉, are assumed to be
orthonormal to each other,
〈 Am | An 〉 = δmn ,
which means that the alternatives are mutually exclusive. The alternative vectors are not
required to form a basis. To each alternative, it is possible to put into correspondence the
alternative operator
Pˆ (An) = | An 〉〈 An | . (4)
These operators enjoy the properties of projectors
Pˆ (Am)Pˆ (An) = δmnPˆ (An) ,
∑
n
Pˆ (An) = 1 ,
whose family forms a projection-valued measure.
The state of a decision maker is represented by a statistical operator that is a semi-positive
trace-one operator,
TrH ρˆ(t) = 1 , (5)
depending on time t and acting on the space H. In decision making, ρˆ is termed the
decision-maker state or just the decision state. The pair {H, ρ(t)} is a decision ensemble.
The probability of observing an event An is
p(An, t) = TrH ρˆ(t)Pˆ (An) , (6)
which is uniquely defined for a Hilbert space of dimensionality larger than two [22]. Since
Pˆ (An) acts on the space HA, probability (6) can be rewritten as
p(An, t) = TrA ρˆA(t)Pˆ (An) , (7)
where the trace is over the space HA, and
ρˆA(t) = TrS ρˆ(t) =
∑
α
〈 α | ρˆ(t) | α 〉 , (8)
with the trace over the space HS. Note that probability (7) can also be written as
p(An, t) = TrA Pˆ (An)ρˆA(t)Pˆ (An) .
Expression (6), or (7), is the predicted probability of observing an event An, or in decision
theory, this is the predicted probability of choosing an alternative An. When comparing the
predicted theoretical probabilities with empirical probabilities, the former are interpreted
in the frequentist framework [23, 24]. Thus p(An, t) is the fraction of equivalent decision
makers preferring the alternative An at time t. This can be reformulated in the different
way: p(An, t) is the frequency of choosing the alternative An by a decision maker, if the
choice is repeated many times under the same conditions until the time t.
We say that an alternative Ai is stochastically preferred (or simply preferred) to an
alternative Aj if and only if p(Ai) > p(Aj), and the alternatives Ai and Aj are stochastically
indifferent if and only if p(Ai) = p(Aj).
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3 Single Decision Making
Usually, one considers decision making as a process instantaneous in time, which is certainly
a too rough modeling. Here we stress the importance of dealing with realistic decision making
developing in time. The evolutionary picture saves us from different inconsistences arising
in the toy model of instantaneous decisions [18, 25].
Suppose at the initial time t = 0 we plan to make a choice between the alternatives from
the given set. This implies a stage of preparation, when the decision maker is characterized
by a state ρˆ(0). The evolution of the decision-maker state in time can be represented as
ρˆ(t) = Uˆ(t) ρˆ(0) Uˆ+(t) , (9)
involving the evolution operator Uˆ(t). To keep the state normalization intact, the evolution
operator has to be unitary,
Uˆ+(t)Uˆ(t) = 1 .
By employing a self-adjoint evolution generator Hˆ(t), the time transformation of the evolu-
tion operator can be written as the Lie differential equation
d
dt
Uˆ(t) = Hˆ(t)Uˆ(t) , (10)
with the initial condition
Uˆ(0) = 1ˆ . (11)
A very important clause is the requirement that the considered decision makers be well
defined individuals, who do not drastically vary in time, otherwise there would be no meaning
in predicting their decisions. In other words, the mental features of decision makers at one
moment of time are to be similar to those at a different moment of time. Briefly speaking,
we can say that the decision makers should have the property of self-similarity. This imposes
a restriction on the form of the evolution generator. This restriction can be written as the
commutator [
Hˆ(t),
∫ t
0
Hˆ(t′)dt′
]
= 0 . (12)
Recall that in quantum theory the operator commuting with the evolution generator is
called the integral of motion. In our case, condition (12) does not mean that the evolution
generator does not depend on time, but it tells us that the properties of this operator are in
some sense invariant with time, preserving the similarity of the decision makers at different
moments of time. So, in decision theory, condition (12) can be understood as the invariance
of the properties of decision makers, that is, of the decision-maker self-similarity. In the
theory of operator differential equations, commutator (12) is termed the Lappo-Danilevsky
condition [26]. Under this provision, the evolution operator, satisfying the evolution equation
(10), with the initial condition (11), reads as
U(t) = exp
{
−i
∫ t
0
Hˆ(t′) dt′
}
. (13)
This form of the evolution operator satisfies the group properties that can be represented as
the property of functional self-similarity [27].
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Till now, we have not specified the choice of a basis for the decision space H. It is
convenient to accept as the basis that one composed of the eigenfunctions of the evolution
generator, such that
Hˆ(t) | nα 〉 = Enα(t) | nα 〉 . (14)
Generally, the eigenfunctions here can depend on time. However, there are two cases when
this dependence is either negligible or absent at all. One possibility is when the eigen-
functions vary with time much slower than the eigenvalues Enα(t). Then there exists a
time horizon till which the time variation of the eigenfunction can be neglected, which is
regulated by a kind of adiabatic conditions [28]. The other case is the already assumed
Lappo-Danilevsky condition (12) implying the decision-maker self-similarity. It is easy to
show that the Lappo-Danilevsky condition (12) is equivalent to the validity of eigenproblem
(14) with time-independent eigenfunctions. Exactly the same situation happens in quantum
theory in the case of nondestructive, or nondemolition, measurements [29–35].
This basis is complete, since the evolution generator is self-adjoint. Then
Uˆ(t) | nα 〉 = Unα(t) | nα 〉 , (15)
where
Unα(t) = exp
{
−i
∫ t
0
Enα(t
′) dt′
}
. (16)
In this way, we find the expression for the time-dependent predicted probability of choos-
ing the alternative An at time t,
p(An, t) =
∑
n1n2
∑
α
Un1α(t)〈 αn1 | ρˆ(0) | n2α 〉 U
∗
n2α
(t)〈 n2 | Pˆ (An) | n1 〉 . (17)
Again, to compare this expression with experimentally observed, it is reasonable to interpret
it as a frequentist probability [23, 24], although other interpretations are admissible [36].
The evolution generator is defined on the decision space H and characterizes the velocity
of the change of the decision-maker state caused by the influence of the set of alternatives.
The impact of the evolution generator on the decision-maker state is assumed to be finite,
such that, if the decision process starts at time tA and ends at time tA + τA, being taken in
the time interval [tA, tA + τA], then∣∣∣∣
∫ tA+τA
tA
Enα(t) dt
∣∣∣∣ <∞ . (18)
Although this impact can be asymptotically large, remaining finite. The speed of the decision
process can be quantified by a rate parameter g, which the eigenvalue Enα(t) = Enα(t, g)
depends on in such a way that in the limit of a slow process
Enα(t, g)→ 0 (g → 0) , (19)
while under a fast process
Enα(t, g)→∞ (g →∞) . (20)
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In the case of a slow process,
Unα(t) ≃ 1 (g → 0) .
This yields the probability
p(An, t) ≃ TrA ρˆA(0)Pˆ (An) (g → 0) , (21)
which implies that the decision state practically does not change:
ρˆA(t) ≃ ρˆA(0) (g → 0) . (22)
When the process is fast, in the sum (17) one has
Umα(t) U
∗
nα(t) ≃ δmn (g →∞) .
This leads to the probability
p(An, t) ≃ TrA ρˆA(t)Pˆ (An) (g →∞) , (23)
with the state
ρˆA(t) ≃
∑
m
Pˆm ρˆA(0) Pˆm (g →∞) , (24)
where
Pˆm ≡ | m 〉〈 m | .
In the intermediate cases of the process rate, one has to resort to the general probability
(17).
4 Changing Initial Conditions
Assume that a subject made a decision during the time interval [tA, tn ≡ tA + τA] choosing
the alternative An. Then what would be the following evolution of the probability p(An, t)?
Strictly speaking, there is nothing special in the fact of one subject making a decision at
any moment of time. According to the frequentist understanding, the probability gives a
distribution over an ensemble of decision makers or over many repeated decisions. This
means that the probability yields a fraction of decision makers (or the fraction of decisions)
preferring this or that alternative. In the following moments of time, the probability will
continue to be defined by expression (17).
However, one can put the question in a different manner: Suppose we are interested
in the decision making of just a single subject who certainly chose the alternative An, so
that at the moment tn the probability became one, instead of that prescribed by expression
(17). Then what would be the following evolution of the probability? Again, there is
nothing extraordinary in that case. Before making a decision, the predicted probability
was described by expression (17). After making the decision, if we insist that a posteriori
probability became one, this means that we have to replace p(An, tn) by one, treating the
latter as a new initial condition. So, the replacement
p(An, tn) 7−→ 1 (25)
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means nothing but the change of the initial condition for the equation describing the evolu-
tion of the decision state. The related replacement
ρˆA(tn) 7−→ ρˆL(tn) (26)
assumes that starting from the moment of time tn, we treat as the new initial condition the
state defined by the equality
TrA ρˆL(tn)Pˆ (An) = 1 . (27)
The simplest solution for the latter equation is the Lu¨ders state [37]
ρˆL(tn) =
Pˆ (An)ρˆA(tn)Pˆ (An)
TrA ρˆA(tn)Pˆ (An)
. (28)
Note that here ρˆL(tn) is the a posteriori post-decision state, while ρˆA(tn) is a priori anticipated
state, that is
ρˆL(tn) ≡ ρˆL(tn + 0) , ρˆA(tn) ≡ ρˆA(tn − 0) .
The replacement (26) often is labeled ”collapse”. For wave functions, this replacement is
equivalent to the sudden change from a state |ψ〉 to the state |An〉. It is really easy to check
that the wave function ”collapse” implies the replacement
ρˆA(tn) = | ψ 〉〈 ψ | 7−→ ρˆL(tn) = | An 〉〈 An | .
Under the name ”collapse” one means a sudden jump of the state, which could be dramatic
provided the wave function or decision state would describe real matter. However, a decision
state, as well as a wave function, are nothing but the probabilistic characteristics that can be
used for calculating and predict a priori quantum probabilities satisfying evolution equations.
Fixing a decision state at some moment of time simply means fixing new initial conditions for
the state evolution. Thus the Lu¨ders state is just the new initial condition for the moment
of time tn,
ρˆL(tn) = TrS ρˆ(tn, tn) , (29)
after which again the predicted probabilities have to be found from the state evolution
ρˆ(t, tn) = Uˆ(t, tn) ρˆ(tn, tn) Uˆ
+(t, tn) , (30)
with the evolution operator
Uˆ(t, tn) = exp
{
−i
∫ t
tn
Hˆ(t′) dt′
}
. (31)
This defines the decision state
ρˆA(t, tn) = TrS ρˆ(t, tn) (t > tn) (32)
after the time tn. Respectively, this decision state gives the probability of choosing an
alternative Am after the time tn,
p(Am, t) = TrA ρˆA(t, tn) Pˆ (Am) (t > tn) . (33)
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Comparing expressions (29) and (32) yields the initial condition
ρˆA(tn, tn) = ρˆL(tn) . (34)
Following the same steps as in the previous section, we get the time evolution of the
probability for t > tn,
p(Am, t) =
∑
n1n2
∑
α
Un1α(t, tn)〈 αn1 | ρˆ(tn, tn) | n2α 〉×
× U∗n2α(t, tn)〈 n2 | Pˆ (Am) | n1 〉 (t > tn) , (35)
where
Unα(t, tn) = exp
{
−i
∫ t
tn
Enα(t
′) dt′
}
.
In the limit of a slow process, this results in
ρˆA(t, tn) ≃ ρˆL(tn) (g → 0) . (36)
And under a fast process, we have
ρˆA(t, tn) ≃
∑
m
Pˆm ρˆL(tn) Pˆm (g →∞) . (37)
Let us consider the situation, when a subject, after fixing the initial condition (29),
where the alternative An was chosen, is interested in finding the probability of deciding on
the alternative Am. In the slow-process limit, we get
p(Am, t) = TrA ρˆL(tn) Pˆ (Am) ≡ pL(Am, tn) . (38)
Introducing the Wigner [38] probability
pW (Am, tn) = TrA Pˆ (An) ρˆA(tn) Pˆ (An) Pˆ (Am) (39)
yields the relation
pW (Am, tn) = pL(Am, tn) p(An, tn) , (40)
where
p(An, tn) = TrA ρˆA(tn) Pˆ (An) .
This equation reminds us the relation between the classical joint and conditional proba-
bilities. Therefore sometimes one is tempted to interpret the Wigner probability, pW (Am, tn)
as a joint probability of two events, An and Am, while the Lu¨ders probability pL(Am, tn),
as a conditional probability of the event Am under the event An previously happened. This
interpretation, however, cannot pretend to provide a generalization of classical probabilities
to quantum theory. This, first of all, because the derived relation is a very particular case of
extremely slow processes, when g → 0, but not the general expression. Second, this relation
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is not valid for all times, but it only connects the terms at time tn. What is more impor-
tant, this relation contains the terms taken from different sides of tn, that is, connecting the
predicted a priori probability with the post-decision a posteriori probability,
pL(Am, tn + 0) =
pW (Am, tn − 0)
p(An, tn − 0)
.
But the meaningful definition of a probability should be valid for any time t > tn. Third, the
generalization of a classical expression assumes to contain the classical one as a particular
case. But it is easy to check that the Lu¨ders probability is
pL(Am, tn) = | 〈 Am | An 〉 |
2 ,
which is symmetric with respect to the interchange between Am and An. For commuting
events, corresponding to the classical case, the Lu¨ders probability becomes trivial δmn. Con-
trary to this, the classical conditional probability is neither symmetric nor trivial, which is
confirmed by numerous empirical observations [39, 40]. In the best case, the Lu¨ders proba-
bility is just a transition probability [18, 25].
Sometimes one tries to save the interpretation of the Lu¨ders probability as a conditional
probability by resorting to the assumption of degenerate quantum states. This, nevertheless,
does not save the situation because of several reasons: The origin of degeneracy is never
defined, which makes the assumption groundless. The degeneracy is not important, since it
always can be lifted by infinitesimally small variations of the problem [18, 25]. Finally, the
degeneracy does not make classical expressions a particular case of quantum formulae, i.e.
there is no quantum-classical correspondence [18, 25, 41].
As we see, the consideration of realistic, developing in time, decision processes helps
us to avoid misrepresentation of the obtained expressions. The use of formal relations,
neglecting evolutionary processes, can lead to meaningless results like negative and complex
probabilities [18, 25, 42].
5 Successive Decision Making
When we consider the alternatives from the same set, say {An}, the probability of any An
is described by the approach elucidated in the previous sections, which leads to the set of
the probabilities {p(An, t) : n = 1, 2, . . . , NA}. A rather different problem is the definition
of successive decisions with respect to alternatives from different sets. Below we consider
this problem employing some of the methods from the theory of quantum measurements
[21,42–44], however essentially modifying them in order to adjust to quantum decision theory
[18, 25].
Suppose there are two sets of alternatives, {An : n = 1, 2, . . . , NA} and {Bk : k =
1, 2, . . . , NB}. At the time interval [tA, tA + τA], a subject makes a decision with respect to
the alternatives An. Then, in the time interval [tB + τB], where tB > tA + τA, the subject
decides about Bk.
According to the general approach of defining quantum joint probabilities [18, 25], each
set of alternatives is represented by the related set of alternative vectors and alternative
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projection operators,
An 7−→ | An 〉 7−→ Pˆ (An) ≡ | An 〉〈 An | ,
Bk 7−→ | Bk 〉 7−→ Pˆ (Bk) ≡ | Bk 〉〈 Bk | . (41)
Respectively, there are two spaces of alternatives:
HA = span{| n 〉} , HB = span{| k 〉} , (42)
whose bases, in general, are different. Recollecting the existence of the subject space of mind
HS, we have the decision space
H = HA
⊗
HB
⊗
HS . (43)
The decision-maker state is subject to the time evolution (9). The evolution operator
satisfies the evolution equation (10), now with the evolution generator
Hˆ(t) = HˆAS(t)
⊗
1ˆB + 1ˆA
⊗
HˆBS(t). (44)
Again it is convenient to choose the basis composed of the eigenfunctions of the evolution
generator, such that
Hˆ(t) | nkα 〉 = Enkα(t) | nkα 〉 . (45)
This assumes the self-similarity of the decision maker in the form of the Lappo-Danilevsky
condition (12), because of which we have
Uˆ(t) | nkα 〉 = Unkα(t) | nkα 〉 , (46)
where
Unkα(t) = exp
{
−i
∫ t
0
Enkα(t
′) dt′
}
. (47)
The joint probability that, first, a decision on An is taken (an event An happens) and
later a decision on Bk is made (an event Bk occurs) is defined as
p(BkAn, t) ≡ TrH ρˆ(t) Pˆ (Bk)
⊗
Pˆ (An) . (48)
This also can be written as
p(BkAn, t) ≡ TrAB ρˆAB(t) Pˆ (Bk)
⊗
Pˆ (An) , (49)
where
ρˆAB(t) ≡ TrS ρˆ(t) =
∑
α
〈 α | ρˆ(t) | α 〉 . (50)
Expanding this results in the expression for the sought joint probability of choosing first the
alternative An and later the alternative Bk yields
p(BkAn, t) =
∑
n1n2
∑
k1k2
∑
α
Un1k1α(t)〈 αk1n1 | ρˆ(0) | n2k2α 〉 U
∗
n2k2α
(t)×
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× 〈 k2 | Pˆ (Bk) | k1 〉〈 n2 | Pˆ (An) | n1 〉 . (51)
The process of taking decisions is supposed to be smooth, such that its impact does not
result in finite-time divergences,∣∣∣∣
∫ tA+τA
tA
Enkα(t) dt +
∫ tB+τA
tB
Enkα(t) dt
∣∣∣∣ < ∞ . (52)
The quantity Enkα(t) characterizes the speed of the process of the subject deliberating about
the given alternatives. For convenience, it is possible to define a rate parameter, entering
the eigenvalue
Enkα(t) = Enkα(t, g) (53)
in such a way that a slow process would imply
Enkα(t, g)→ 0 (g → 0) , (54)
while a fast process would mean that
Enkα(t, g)→∞ (g →∞) . (55)
When the process is slow, we have
Unkα(t) ≃ 1 (g → 0) . (56)
Then the corresponding probability becomes
p(BkAn, t) ≃ TrAB ρˆAB(0) Pˆ (Bk)
⊗
Pˆ (An) (g → 0) , (57)
while the decision state reads as
ρˆAB(t) ≃ ρˆAB(0) (g → 0) . (58)
It is useful to stress that even if at the initial moment of time the decisions on An and
Bk formally look to be not explicitly connected, so that
ρˆ(0) = ρˆAS(0)
⊗
ρˆBS(0) ,
anyway the decision state does not factorize,
ρˆAB(0) = TrS ρˆAS(0)
⊗
ρˆBS(0) ,
being entangled through the subject mind. Only in the extreme, little realistic, case when
at the initial moment of time all processes are absolutely not correlated, so that
ρˆ(0) = ρˆA(0)
⊗
ρˆB(0)
⊗
ρˆS(0) ,
only then the joint probability factorizes,
p(BkAn, 0) = p(Bk, 0) p(An, 0) .
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Thus, even deciding on different alternatives, the total decision state, generally, remains
entangled, therefore producing entangled states in the process of decision making [45]. The
produced entanglement can be measured [46–51].
For a fast process, we have
Un1k1α(t) Un2k2α(t) ≃ δn1n2δk1k2 . (59)
Then the decision state reduces to
ρˆAB(t) ≃
∑
nk
Pˆn
⊗
Pˆk ρˆAB(0) Pˆn
⊗
Pˆk (g →∞) , (60)
where
Pˆn = | n 〉〈 n | , Pˆk = | k 〉〈 k | .
It is important to emphasize that the joint probability (48) is real-valued,
p∗(BkAn, t) = p(BkAn, t) . (61)
It is not symmetric with respect to the interchange of An and Bk, since the evolution gener-
ator (44) depends on the order of decisions, first being An and second, Bk. As is postulated
at the beginning of this section, at the time interval [tA, tA+ τA], a subject makes a decision
on the alternatives An. Then, in the time interval [tB + τB], where tB > tA+ τA, the subject
decides on Bk. This means that the evolution generator can be presented as
Hˆ(t) =


HˆAS(t)
⊗
1ˆB , t ≤ tA + τA
1ˆA
⊗
HˆBS(t) , t > tB > tA + τA
.
From here its dependence on the order of decisions is evident. We may notice that the
interchange of the decisions on An and Bk is similar to the inversion of time, hence
p(BkAn, t) = p(AnBk,−t) .
Also, it is useful to compare the joint probability (49) with the Kirkwood distribution [52].
The latter is defined for two coinciding in time events, whose projectors pertain to the same
space of alternatives HA = HB, which gives
pK(BkAn) ≡ TrA ρˆA Pˆ (Bk) Pˆ (An) .
It easy to see from the complex conjugate expression
p∗K(BkAn) = TrA ρˆA Pˆ (An) Pˆ (Bk) = pK(AnBk)
that
p∗K(BkAn) 6= pK(BkAn) ,
which tells us that the Kirkwood distribution, generally, is complex-valued. Thus the com-
plex Kirkwood distribution and the real joint probability (49) are principally different.
13
6 Dual Decision Process
Subjects rarely make decisions being based solely on the usefulness of alternatives, as pre-
scribed by utility theory [9], especially when decisions are to be made under uncertainty.
The choice between alternatives is practically always not purely objective and based on well
defined values that could be quantified, but strong subjective feelings, biases, and heuris-
tics are involved in the process of taking decisions [53, 54]. Intuition and emotions are also
subjective, but they help us to take decisions, being a kind of decision-making process [55].
Taking account of subjective feelings and emotions in taking decisions is important for the
problem of human-computer interaction [56] and creation of artificial intelligence [57, 58].
Understanding that human decision making involves two sides, the rational evaluation
of utility and intuitive irrational attraction or repulsion towards each of the alternatives,
has been thoroughly investigated and elucidated in the approach called dual-process theory
[59–62]. Quantum techniques seem to be the most appropriate for portraying the duality
of human decision processes, since quantum theory presupposes the so-called wave-particle
duality. Below we show how the dual-process approach [59–62] is formulated in quantum
language [10, 46, 63–65].
Thus to describe decision making by real subjects it is necessary to take into account
the rational-irrational duality of decision making. First, we need to say several words on
the meaning of the notion ”rational” that can be understood in different senses [66]. It
is necessary to distinguish between the philosophical and psychological meanings of this
term. In philosophical writings, one gives the definition of ”rational” as all what leads to
the desired goal [67]. However, under that definition, any illogical uncontrolled feeling that
leads to the goal should be named rational. In decision making one uses the psychological
meaning of the term ”rational” as what can be explained and evaluated logically and what
follows explicitly formulated rules. On the contrary, emotions, intuition, and moral feelings
cannot be logically and explicitly formulated and quantified, especially at the moment of
taking a decision. So, ”rational” in decision making is what can be explicitly formulated,
based on clear rules, deterministic, logical, prescriptive, normative. While ”irrational” is
just the opposite to ”rational”.
In this way, one has to separate the psychological and philosophical definitions of ”ra-
tional” or ”irrational”. The psychological definition assumes that the distinction between
”rational” and ”irrational” is done at the moment of taking a decision. Conversely, the
philosophical definition of ”rational” as what leads to the goal is a definition that can work
better afterwards, when the goal has been reached. Only then it becomes clear what was
leading to the goal and what was not. At the moment of taking a decision, it is not always
clear what leads to the goal and what does not.
The separation in decision making into rational and irrational has a simple and well
defined psychological meaning based on actual physiological processes in the brain [68]. One
often calls rational processes as conscious, while irrational processes as subconscious.
From the mathematical point of view, the said above can be formulated as follows. Let
us consider the choice between a set of alternatives An. An alternative is represented by a
vector |An〉 in a Hilbert space of alternatives HA and by a projector Pˆ (An) acting on this
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space. The subject space of mind is HS. So, the decision space is
H = HA
⊗
HS . (62)
As is explained above, when choosing between alternatives, in addition to the rational
evaluation of the utility of each alternative, the decision maker experiences irrational feelings.
This implies that each alternative An, and its representation |An〉 in the space of alternatives
HA, is complimented by a set of subjective feelings zn represented by a vector |zn〉 in the
subject space of mind HS. That is, in the process of decision making one compares not
merely the alternatives An, but the composite prospects
πn ≡ Anzn . (63)
Being a member of the subject space of mind, the vector |zn〉 allows for the expansion
| zn 〉 =
∑
α
bnα | α 〉 , (64)
in which bnα are random quantities, which signifies a non-deterministic character of irrational
feelings and emotions.
We do not impose excessive number of conditions, trying to limit ourselves by the minimal
number of restrictions. The required conditions will be imposed on the resulting expressions
describing probability. Therefore the vectors |zn〉 are not forced to be obligatory normalized,
so that the scalar product
〈 zn | zn 〉 =
∑
α
|bnα |
2
does not have to be one. Also, the vectors |zn〉 with different labels are not orthogonal to
each other. Respectively, the operator
Pˆ (zn) ≡ | zn 〉〈 zn | =
∑
αβ
bnαb
∗
nβ | α 〉〈 β | (65)
is not a projector, since
Pˆ (zm)Pˆ (zn) =
(∑
α
b∗mαbnα
)
| zm 〉〈 zn | .
The prospect Anzn is represented by the vector
| Anzn 〉 = | An 〉
⊗
| zn 〉 =
∑
α
bnα| Anα 〉 (66)
in the decision space H. The prospect operator
Pˆ (Anzn) ≡ | Anzn 〉〈 znAn | = Pˆ (An)
⊗
Pˆ (zn) , (67)
with the property
Pˆ (Amzm)Pˆ (Anzn) = δmn〈 zn | zn 〉Pˆ (Anzn) ,
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is not idempotent and is not a projector.
The resolution of unity ∑
n
Pˆ (Anzn) = 1 (68)
is understood in the weak sense as the equality on average〈∑
n
Pˆ (Anzn)
〉
= 1 , (69)
which implies
TrH ρˆ(t)
∑
n
Pˆ (Anzn) = 1 . (70)
The extended version of the latter equality reads as∑
n
∑
αβ
b∗nαbnβ 〈 αAn | ρˆ(t) | Anβ 〉 = 1 . (71)
The set of the operators {Pˆ (Anzn)} forms a kind of the positive operator-valued measure [69].
Thus, making a decision on an alternative An, a decision maker, as a matter of fact,
considers a prospect πn = Anzn, as far as, in addition to the rational quantification of the al-
ternative utility, this alternative is subject to irrational subconscious evaluations. A decision
maker not merely makes a decision on the usefulness of an alternative, but also experiences
feelings of attraction or repulsion to this alternative. Thus the probability of choosing an
alternative is in fact a behavioral probability of the associated prospect comprising a decision
on the utility as well as on the attractiveness of the alternative [65]. Keeping in mind that de
facto one practically always considers prospects associated with the given alternatives, and
in order not to complicate notation, we shall denote the behavioral probability of a prospect
p(πn, t) ≡ TrH ρˆ(t) Pˆ (πn) ≡ p(An, t) (72)
as identified with the alternative probability
p(An, t) = TrH ρˆ(t) Pˆ (Anzn) . (73)
The resolution of unity (70) or (71) guarantees the probability normalization∑
n
p(An, t) = 1 , 0 ≤ p(An, t) ≤ 1 . (74)
Separating in expression (73) diagonal terms
f(An, t) ≡
∑
α
| bnα |
2 〈 αAn | ρˆ(t) | Anα 〉 (75)
from off-diagonal terms
q(An, t) ≡
∑
α6=β
b∗nαbnβ 〈 αAn | ρˆ(t) | Anβ 〉 , (76)
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we obtain the behavioral probability
p(An, t) = f(An, t) + q(An, t) . (77)
In the theory of quantum measurements, the diagonal term corresponds to classical the-
ory, while the second, off-diagonal, term is due to quantum interference and coherence. The
transition from quantum to classical measurements and from quantum to classical proba-
bilities is called decoherence [70]. Thus the first term corresponds to a classical probability
enjoying the properties ∑
n
f(An, t) = 1 , 0 ≤ f(An, t) ≤ 1 . (78)
In decision theory, the classical probability is responsible for a rational choice of alternatives
and can be named rational fraction or utility fraction, since its value is prescribed by the
utility of the alternative [25, 46, 65, 71, 72].
The second term, entirely due to quantum effects, has the properties∑
n
q(An, t) = 0 , −1 ≤ q(An, t) ≤ 1 (79)
following from equations (77) and (78). The property (79) is named the alternation law
[25, 46, 65, 71, 72]. From normalization (74), we also have
−f(An, t) ≤ q(An, t) ≤ 1− f(An, t) .
The quantum term q in decision theory is associated with irrational feelings characterizing the
emotional attitude of the decision maker to the quality of considered alternatives, because of
which it can be called irrational factor, or attraction factor, or quality factor [25,46,65,71,72].
As is seen, for an alternative Ai to be stochastically preferred over Aj, so that p(Ai) >
p(Aj), it is not always sufficient to be more useful, but it is necessary to be sufficiently
attractive. An optimal alternative is that possessing the largest probability among the set
of the considered alternatives.
For any generalization of decision theory, it is very important to include as a particular
case the classical decision theory based on expected utility. Quantum decision theory [25,46,
65, 71, 72] satisfies this requirement. The return to classical decision theory happens when
the quantum term q tends to zero. This can be called the quantum-classical correspondence
principle:
p(An, t)→ f(An, t) , q(An, t)→ 0 . (80)
In the theory of quantum measurements, the disappearance of the quantum term, corre-
sponding to quantum coherence, is called decoherence. The vanishing of this term can
be due to the influence of surrounding environment [70, 73–75] or to the action of mea-
surements [35, 76]. In decision theory, the decoherence can be caused by the influence of
society providing information to the decision maker [77]. In both these cases, random dis-
turbances from either surrounding or measurement devices, lead to the irreversibility of time
arrow [78, 79].
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7 Evolution of Behavioral Probability
The temporal evolution of the behavioral probability (77) can be treated as in Sec. 3. The
time dependence enters the matrix element
〈 αAn | ρˆ(t) | Anβ 〉 =
∑
n1n2
Un1α(t)〈 An | n1 〉〈 αn1 | ρˆ(0) | n2β 〉 U
∗
n2β
(t)〈 n2 | An 〉 . (81)
If the process in the space of mind is asymptotically slow, then
Unα(t) ≃ 1 (g → 0)
and we get
〈 αAn | ρˆ(t) | Anβ 〉 ≃ 〈 αAn | ρˆ(0) | Anβ 〉 . (82)
This means that
f(An, t) ≃ f(An, 0) , q(An, t) ≃ q(An, 0) , (83)
so that the probability practically does not change:
p(An, t) ≃ p(An, 0) (g → 0) . (84)
In the opposite case of a fast process, when
Umα(t) U
∗
nβ(t) ≃ δmnδαβ (g →∞) ,
we obtain
〈 αAn | ρˆ(t) | Anβ 〉 ≃ δαβ
∑
m
〈 An | m 〉〈 αm | ρˆ(0) | mα 〉〈 m | An 〉 (g →∞) . (85)
Then the rational fraction reads as
f(An, t) ≃
∑
α
| bnα |
2 〈αAn | ρˆ(t) | Anα 〉 , (86)
where
ρˆ(t) =
∑
m
Pˆm ρˆ(0) Pˆm (g →∞) , (87)
while the quantum term, characterizing irrational feelings, vanishes:
q(An, t) ≃ 0 (g →∞) . (88)
Therefore the behavioral probability reduces to the rational part,
p(An, t) ≃ f(An, t) (g →∞) . (89)
Successive decision making can be described similarly to Sec. 5. For two successive
decisions, one has to consider the probability
p(BkAn, t) = TrH ρˆ(t) Pˆ (Bkzk)
⊗
Pˆ (Anzn) . (90)
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The above results demonstrate the essential dependence of the irrational term q from
the speed of taking decisions. The fact that, under a slow decision process, the probability
practically does not vary, remaining close to that existing at the initial time, is not surprising.
What is more interesting is that under a fast decision process the quantum term vanishes.
This can be explained as follows. The quantum term is caused by the interference and
entanglement of subconscious feelings in the subject consciousness. In order that these
processes would happen they need some time. However in the case of an extremely fast
decision making the subject just has no time for deliberation when the acts of coherence and
entanglement could develop.
8 Evaluation of Initial Probability
Before considering any evolutional process, it is necessary to prescribe initial conditions
corresponding to the initial moment of time that can be set as t = 0. The initial probability
p(An) ≡ p(An, 0) = f(An) + q(An) (91)
is formed by the initial rational fraction and irrational factor,
f(An) ≡ f(An, 0) , q(An) ≡ q(An, 0) . (92)
To estimate the value of the initial rational fraction, it is possible to use the Luce rule
[80], according to which, if the alternative An is characterized by an attribute an, then the
alternative weight can be written as
f(An) =
an∑
n an
(an ≥ 0) . (93)
For concreteness, let us study the case where alternatives are represented by lotteries
An = {xi, pn(xi) : i = 1, 2, . . . , Nn} , (94)
where xi are outcomes and pn(xi) are the outcome probabilities normalized so that∑
i
pn(xi) = 1 , 0 ≤ pn(xi) ≤ 1 .
Employing a utility function u(x), one can define [9] the expected utility
U(An) =
∑
i
u(xi)pn(xi) . (95)
The rational fraction describes the classical weight of an alternative that in the present
case is connected with the expected utility in the following way [71, 72]. If the expected
utilities of all alternatives are semi-positive, they can be associated with the alternative
attributes,
an = U(An) , U(An) ≥ 0 , (96)
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while if all utilities are negative, the alternative attributes can be defined by the inverse
quantities
an =
1
| U(An) |
, U(An) < 0 . (97)
In the case when among the expected utilities there are both positive as well as negative
utilities, it is possible to use the shift taking account of the available wealth U0. This is done
in the following way. Finding the minimal negative utility
Umin ≡ min
n
U(An) < 0 ,
one defines
U0 ≡ | Umin |
interpreted as the wealth available to decision makers before they make decisions. Then the
shifted utilities
U(An) ≡ U(An) + U0 ≥ 0 (98)
are used instead of U(An), and we return to the case of semi-positive expected utilities.
The so defined rational fraction, or utility fraction, enjoys the natural properties: For
semi-positive utilities, the fraction tends to zero, when its utility tends to zero,
f(An)→ 0 , U(An)→ +0 , (99)
and tends to one, when its utility is very large,
f(An)→ 1 , U(An)→ +∞ . (100)
For negative expected utilities, we have
f(An)→ 1 , U(An)→ −0 , (101)
and respectively,
f(An)→ 0 , U(An)→ −∞ . (102)
When considering empirical data, the rational fraction characterizes the fraction of decision
makers taking decisions on the basis of rational normative rules. A more elaborate expression
for the rational fraction can be derived by employing the minimization of an information
functional [65, 71, 72].
The irrational factor q, as has been explained above, is a random quantity distributed
over the interval [−1, 1]. However, being a random variable does not preclude it to possess a
typical average quantity. The ways of defining a non-informative prior for q are described in
Refs. [46, 65, 71, 72]. Below we present a slightly modified derivation of the non-informative
prior for the irrational factor.
Let the related distribution function be denoted as ϕ(x). This distribution is normalized∫
1
−1
ϕ(x) dx = 1 . (103)
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Then the average value of a positive irrational factor is defined as
q+ =
∫
1
0
xϕ(x) dx . (104)
Respectively, the average value of a negative factor is
q− =
∫
0
−1
xϕ(x) dx . (105)
Proposition. The non-informative priors for the average irrational factors are
q+ =
1
4
, q− = −
1
4
. (106)
Proof. With the notation
λ+ =
∫
1
0
ϕ(x) dx , λ− =
∫
0
−1
ϕ(x) dx , (107)
the normalization condition (103) takes the form
λ+ + λ− = 1 , 0 ≤ λ± ≤ 1 . (108)
In the average irrational factors (104) and (105), x is a monotonic function, while ϕ(x) is
integrable. Therefore employing the theorem of average yields
q+ = x+λ+ , q− = x−λ− , (109)
where
0 ≤ x+ ≤ 1 , −1 ≤ x− ≤ 0 . (110)
As a non-informative prior for the values of x± and λ± one takes the averages over the
domains of their definition, that is,
x+ =
1
2
, x− = −
1
2
, λ± =
1
2
. (111)
Substituting this into quantities (104) and (105) proves equalities (106).
This property is termed the quarter law. The mentioned above alternation law and the
quarter law can be used for estimating the aggregate values of the behavioral probabilities
according to the rule
p(An) = f(An)± 0.25. (112)
The sign of the irrational factor is prescribed in accordance to the alternative being attractive
or repulsive [46, 65, 71, 72].
This approach was employed for explaining a number of paradoxes in classical decision
making [46, 63, 64, 71, 72, 81, 82] and was found to be in good agreement with a variety of
experimental observations [65, 71, 72, 83].
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9 Quantum Intelligence Network
In the previous sections, we have considered quantum decision making by subjects that act
independently of each other. Even then the probability of alternatives could vary with time
due to the entangling properties of the evolution operator inducing entanglement in the
decision space [50, 51, 84], in addition to that caused by the initial subject state of mind
[85]. The situation becomes much more involved when subjects exchange their information
with each other. When there is a society of subjects interacting through the exchange of
information, we obtain a network. Since the agents make decisions, we have an intelligence
network. The probabilities of alternatives will vary owing to the informational interaction.
From empirical investigations, it is known that decision makers do alter their decisions as a
result of mutual charing of information [86–93]. This type of intelligence networks plays an
important role as prolegomena into the problem of artificial intelligence [94–96].
Assume that we are considering a society of N agents enumerated by the index i =
1, 2, . . . , N , who decide with respect to alternatives An, with n = 1, 2, . . . , NA. So, the
probability for an i-th agent deciding on an alternative An at the moment of time t is
pi(An, t). Each probability satisfies the standard normalization
NA∑
n=1
pi(An, t) = 1 , 0 ≤ pi(An, t) ≤ 1 . (113)
Accordingly, the related rational fraction fi(An, t) is normalized as
NA∑
n=1
fi(An, t) = 1 , 0 ≤ fi(An, t) ≤ 1 . (114)
And for the irrational factor, one has
NA∑
n=1
qi(An, t) = 0 , −fi(An, t) ≤ qi(An, t) ≤ 1− fi(An, t) . (115)
To give a realistic description for the temporal evolution of an intelligence network, it
is required to take into account that decision making needs some time after receiving infor-
mation. Denoting this delay time as τ , allows us to represent the dynamics of a behavioral
probability as
pi(An, t+ τ) = fi(An, t) + qi(An, t) . (116)
The rational fraction weakly varies with time, so that on the time scale shorter than the
discounting time [97] it can be treated as constant. Its value is prescribed by the utilities of
the given alternatives, as is explained in Sec. 8.
The time dependence of the irrational factor can be derived following Sec. 7, similarly
to the derivation of the coherent interference term in the theory of quantum measurements,
where the role of irrational subconscious feelings is played by the random influence of environ-
ment [35,76,78,79,98]. If a decision maker at time t accumulates the amount of information
Mi(t) from other members of the society, then the irrational factor is discounted from its
initial value, becoming equal to
qi(An, t) = qi(An, 0) exp{−Mi(t)} . (117)
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The amount of the accumulated information composes [77,99] the information-memory func-
tional
Mi(t) =
t∑
t′=1
N∑
j=1
Jij(t, t
′)µij(t
′) , (118)
in which Jij(t, t
′) is the interaction-memory function and µij(t) is the information gain by a
subject i from a subject j at time t. To exclude self-action, one has to set either Jii = 0 or
µii = 0. At the initial moment of time there is no yet additional information, so that one
has the initial condition
Mi(0) = 0 . (119)
The information gain can be modeled by the KullbackLeibler [100,101] relative informa-
tion
µij(t) =
NA∑
n=1
pi(An, t) ln
pi(An, t)
pj(An, t)
. (120)
The information gain (120) is semi-positive, µij ≥ 0, due to the inequality ln x ≥ 1 − 1/x.
As is evident, µii = 0. Depending on the range of the interactions between the agents and
the longevity of their memory, there can arise different situations whose typical examples
are as follows.
Long-range interactions have the form
Jij(t, t
′) =
1
N − 1
J(t, t′) (i 6= j) . (121)
Short-range interactions act only between the nearest neighbors,
Jij(t, t
′) = J(t, t′)δ〈ij〉 , (122)
where δ<ij> equals one for i and j being the nearest neighbours and is zero otherwise.
Long term memory, that lasts forever, does not depend on time,
Jij(t, t
′) = Jij . (123)
Short-term memory, on the contrary, corresponds to the situation, when only the last
step is remembered,
Jij(t, t
′) = Jijδtt′ . (124)
Combining these ultimate cases gives us the following four possibilities for the information-
memory functional.
Long-range interactions and long-term memory:
Mi(t) =
J
N − 1
t∑
t′=1
N∑
j=1
µij(t
′) . (125)
Long-range interactions and short-term memory:
Mi(t) =
J
N − 1
N∑
j=1
µij(t) . (126)
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Short-range interactions and long-term memory:
Mi(t) = J
t∑
t′=1
N∑
j=1
δ〈ij〉µij(t
′) . (127)
Short-range interactions and short-term memory:
Mi(t) = J
N∑
j=1
δ〈ij〉µij(t) . (128)
Keeping in mind modern human societies, we have to accept that long-range interactions
are more realistic. This is because the modern-day information exchange practically does not
depend on the location of interacting agents who are able to exchange information through
phone, Skype, Zoom, etc.
10 Case of Two Alternatives
A very frequent situation is when agents have to decide between two suggested alternatives,
that is, when NA = 2. Then it is straightforward to simplify the notation by setting
pi(A1, t) ≡ pi(t) , pi(A2, t) = 1− pi(t) ,
fi(A1, t) ≡ fi(t) , fi(A2, t) = 1− fi(t) ,
qi(A1, t) ≡ qi(t) , qi(A2, t) = −qi(t) . (129)
Now the dynamics is governed by the equation
pi(t+ τ) = fi(t) + qi(t) , (130)
with the irrational factor
qi(t) = qi(0) exp{−Mi(t)} . (131)
The information gain takes the form
µij(t) = pi(t) ln
pi(t)
pj(t)
+ [ 1− pi(t) ] ln
1− pi(t)
1− pj(t)
. (132)
As is seen, µii = 0. Setting initial conditions, it is necessary to obey the restriction
−fi(0) ≤ qi(0) ≤ 1− fi(0) .
Another realistic simplification could be when the considered society consists of two types
of agents essentially differing by their initial decisions. Then the question is: How the initial
decisions would vary with time being caused by the mutual exchange of information? Will
agents with different initial decisions come to a consensus, as it often happens after a number
of interactions [102, 103]?
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When the society can be divided into two parts of typical agents, with each part having
similar initial decisions within the group, but essentially different initial decisions between
the groups, the situation becomes equivalent to the consideration of two typical agents with
these different initial decisions. As is explained above, long-range interactions are more
realistic for the information exchange in the modern society. Below we present the results
of numerical calculations for this type of interactions. The behaviour of the society strongly
depends on the type of memory the agents have.
Long-term memory. In the case of long-term memory, the information-memory func-
tionals for two groups are
M1(t) = J
t∑
t′=1
µ12(t
′) , M2(t) = J
t∑
t′=1
µ21(t
′) . (133)
The rational fractions are kept constant in time and the parameters are set J = 1 and
τ = 1. The society dynamics is strongly influenced by the initial decisions. There can happen
two types of behaviour depending on the relations between the initial rational fractions and
irrational factors.
(i) Rational group conventions. There is the rational-irrational accordance in the initial
choice of both groups. Then at the initial moment of time, one group, say the first group,
estimates the utility of the first alternative higher than the second group. Taking account
of irrational feelings keeps the same preference with respect to behavioral probabilities:
f1(0) > f2(0) , p1(0) > p2(0) . (134)
Recall that fi(t) ≡ fi(A1, t) and pi(t) ≡ pi(A1, t). Respectively, if the first group estimates
the utility of the first alternative lower than the second group, the irrational feelings do not
change this preference:
f1(0) < f2(0) , p1(0) < p2(0) . (135)
In the case of this rational-irrational accordance, independently of initial conditions, the
behavioral probabilities tend to the respective rational fractions:
pi(t)→ fi(0) (t→∞) . (136)
(ii) Common convention. At the initial time, the inequalities between the rational frac-
tions of the groups and the inequalities between their behavioral probabilities are opposite
with each other, that is, one has either
f1(0) > f2(0) , p1(0) < p2(0) , (137)
or
f1(0) < f2(0) , p1(0) > p2(0) . (138)
In this case, the behavioral probabilities tend with time to the common convention:
pi(t)→ p
∗ (t→∞) (139)
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approximately equal to
p∗ =
f1(0)q2(0)− f2(0)q1(0)
q2(0)− q1(0)
. (140)
These results can be interpreted in the following way. In the situation of the rational-
irrational accordance, the decision makers are more rational, while irrational feelings, such as
emotions, play less important role. Under the prevalence of rational arguments, the agents
are inclined to choose the alternative with a higher utility.
In the case of the rational-irrational discordance, the decision makers are forced to more
efficiently exchange information, as a result of which they manage to develop a mutual
convention.
Short-term memory. In this case, the information-memory functionals are
M1(t) = Jµ12(t) , M2 = Jµ21(t) . (141)
We set again J = 1 and τ = 1. Numerical solution of the evolution equations reveals the
existence of two types of possible dynamics.
(i) Group conventions. The behavioral probabilities for each group tend with time to
their own limits not coinciding with the corresponding rational fractions:
pi(t)→ p
∗
i (t→∞) . (142)
(ii) Everlasting fluctuations. The behavioral probabilities for both groups do not tend to
any fixed point, but demonstrate everlasting oscillations. The details of the above numerical
solutions can be found in Ref. [99].
In the society with short-term memory, there is no enough accumulated information for
the formation of a common convention. Each group in such a society either develops their
own goal, not necessarily rational, or constantly fluctuates without elaborating a consensus.
11 Dynamic Decision Inconsistencies
There are several so-called dynamic or time inconsistencies in decision making characterizing
situations in which a decision-maker’s preferences change over time in such a way that a
preference at one moment of time can become inconsistent with a preference at another
point in time. Below we consider some of these inconsistencies and show that they find quite
natural explanations in QDT.
11.1 Question order bias
The order that several questions are asked in a survey or study can influence the answers
that are given as much as by 40% [104,105]. That is because the human brain has a tendency
to organize information into patterns. The earlier questions may provide information that
subjects use as context in formulating their subsequent answers, or affect their thoughts,
feelings and attitude towards the questioned problem. Sociological research gives a number
of illustrations of this bias [105]. Thus from a December 2008 poll we know that when
people were asked ”All in all, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going
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in this country today?” immediately after having been asked ”Do you approve or disapprove
of the way George W. Bush is handling his job as president?”, 88 percent said they were
dissatisfied, compared with only 78 percent without the context of the prior question.
In classical probability theory, the probability of joint events is symmetric. This is
contrary to the quantum decision theory. Assume an interrogator first asks a question A, so
that the answer suggests two alternatives: yes (A1) or no (A2). After this, the interrogator
poses another question B, also with the possible answers: yes (B1) or no (B2). As follows
from Sec. 5, the probability p(AiBj) does not equal the probability p(BjAi), since they are
defined through different decision states. The situation is similar to that occurring in the
problem of quantum contextuality [106–108], where two random variables (AiBj and BjAi)
cannot be characterized by a single density matrix.
In that way, taking account of dynamic evolution in QDT shows that, in general, the
alternatives are not commutative, in the sense that p(AiBj) 6= p(BjAi), which is in agreement
with the empirical data.
11.2 Planning paradox
In classical decision theory, there is the principle of dynamic consistency according to which
a decision taken at one moment of time should be invariant in time, provided no new in-
formation has become available and all other conditions are not changed. Then a decision
maker, preferring an alternative at time t1 should retain the choice at a later time t2 > t1.
However this principle is often broken, which is called the effect of dynamic inconsistency.
A stylized example of dynamic inconsistency is the planning paradox, when a subject
makes a plan for the future, while behaving contrary to the plan as soon as time comes
to accomplish the latter. A typical case of this inconsistency is the stop-smoking paradox
[109, 110]. A smoker, well understanding damage to health caused from smoking, plans
to stop smoking in the near future, but time goes, future comes, however the person does
not stop smoking. Numerous observations [109] show that 85% of smokers do plan to stop
smoking in the near future, however only 36% really stop smoking during the next year after
making the plan. It is possible to pose the question: would it be feasible to predict the
percentage of subjects who will really stop smoking during the next year, knowing that at
the present time 85% of them plan doing this. Below we show that QDT allows us to make
this prediction [63].
Let us denote by A1 the alternative to stop smoking in the near future, and by A2,
the alternative not to stop smoking. And let us denote by B1 the decision to really stop
smoking, while by B2, the decision of refusing to really stop smoking. According to QDT,
the corresponding probabilities are
p(A1) = f(A1) + q(A1) , p(A2) = f(A2) + q(A2) ,
p(B1) = f(B1) + q(B1) , p(B2) = f(B2) + q(B2) .
The utility factors do not change in time, so that the utility of planning to stop in the near
future is the same as the utility to stop in reality and the utility not to stop in the near
future is the same as that of not stopping in reality,
f(A1) = f(B1) , f(A2) = f(B2) .
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Planning to stop smoking, subjects understand the attractiveness of this due to health
benefits. Hence the average attraction factors, according to Sec. 8, are
q(A1) =
1
4
, q(A2) = −
1
4
.
But as soon as one has to stop smoking in reality, one feels uneasy from the necessity to
forgo the pleasure of smoking, because of which the attraction factors become
q(B1) = −
1
4
, q(B2) =
1
4
.
This is to be complemented by the normalization conditions
p(A1) + p(A2) = 1 , p(B1) + p(B2) = 1 ,
f(A1) + f(A2) = 1 , f(B1) + f(B2) = 1 .
Since 85% of subjects plan to stop smoking, we have
p(A1) = 0.85 , p(A2) = 0.15 .
Solving the above equations, the fraction of subjects who will really stop smoking is predicted
to be
p(B1) = 0.35 , p(B2) = 0.65 .
This is in beautiful agreement with the observed fraction of smokers really stopping smoking
during the next year after taking the decision [109],
pexp(B1) = 0.36 , pexp(B2) = 0.64 .
Thus, knowing only the percentage of subjects planning to stop smoking, it is straightfor-
ward, by means of QDT, to predict the fraction of those who will stop smoking in reality.
This case is also of interest because it gives an example of preference reversal: when plan-
ning to stop smoking, the relation between the probabilities is reversed as compared to the
relation between the fractions of those who have really stopped smoking,
p(A1) > p(A2) , p(B1) < p(B2) .
11.3 Disjunction effect
Disjunction effect is the violation of the sure-thing principle [111]. This principle states: If
the alternative A1 is preferred to the alternative A2, when an event B1 occurs, and it is also
preferred to A2, when an event B2 occurs, then A1 should be preferred to A2, when it is not
known which of the events, either B1 or B2, has occurred. This principle is easily illustrated
for classical probability. Let B = B1 + B2 be the alternative when it is not known which of
the events, either B1 or B2, has occurred. For a classical probability, one has
f(AnB) = f(AnB1) + f(AnB2) (n = 1, 2) .
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From here, it immediately follows that if
f(A1B1) > f(A2B1) , f(A1B2) > f(A2B2) ,
then
f(A1B) > f(A2B) .
However, empirical studies have discovered numerous violations of the sure-thing prin-
ciple, which was called disjunction effect [112]. Such violations are typical for two-step
composite games of the following structure. First, a group of agents takes part in a game,
where each agent can either win (event B1) or lose (event B2), with equal probability 0.5.
They are then invited to participate in a second game, having the right either to accept the
second game (event A1) or to refuse it (event A2). The second stage is realized in different
variants: One can either accept or decline the second game under the condition of knowing
the result of the first game. Or one can either accept or decline the second game without
knowing the result of the first game. The probabilities, as usual, are understood in the
frequentist sense as the fractions of individuals taking the corresponding decisions [99].
From the experiment of Tversky and Shafir [112] we have
f(A1B1) = 0.345 , f(A1B2) = 0.295 ,
f(A2B1) = 0.155 , f(A2B2) = 0.205 .
This shows that the alternative A1B is more useful than A2B, since
f(A1B) = 0.64 , f(A2B) = 0.36 ,
which seems to agree with the sure-thing principle. However f(AnB) is not yet the whole
probability that reads as
p(AnB) = f(AnB) + q(AnB) (n = 1, 2) .
Taking a decision to play, without knowing the result of the first game, is less attractive,
because of which q(A1B) = −1/4, while q(A2B) = 1/4. As a result, we find
p(A1B) = 0.39 , p(A2B) = 0.61 ,
which is in good agreement with the empirical data of Tversky and Shafir [112],
pexp(A1B) = 0.36 , pexp(A2B) = 0.64 .
The dynamic consistency of the disjunction effect can be analyzed as in Secs. 9 and 10.
Details can be found in Ref. [99], where it is shown that, when decision makers are allowed
to exchange information, the absolute values of the attraction factors diminish with time.
This conclusion also is in good agreement with empirical observations [113].
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12 Dynamic Preference Intransitivity
Transitivity is of central importance to both psychology and economics. It is the cornerstone
of normative and descriptive decision theories [9]. Individuals, however, are not perfectly
consistent in their choices. When faced with repeated choices between alternatives A and B,
people often choose in some instances A and B in others. Such inconsistencies are observed
even in the absence of systematic changes in the decision maker’s taste, which might be due
to learning or sequential effects. The observed inconsistencies of this type reflect inherent
variability or momentary fluctuation in the evaluative process. Then preference should be
defined in a probabilistic fashion [80]. Nevertheless, there happen several choice situations
where time transitivity may be violated even in a probabilistic form. Then one says that
there is dynamic preference intransitivity [114–120].
The occurrence of preference intransitivity depends on the considered decision model and
on the accepted definition of transitivity. But the general meaning is as follows. Suppose,
one evaluates three alternatives A, B, C, considering them in turn by pairs. One compares
A and B and, according to the selected definition of preference, concludes that A is preferred
over B, which can be denoted as A > B. Then one compares B and C, finding that B > C.
Finally, comparing C and A, one discovers that C > A. This results in the preference loop
A > B > C > A signifying the intransitivity effect.
As a simple illustration of the intransitivity effect, we can adduce the Fishburn [116]
example. Imagine that a person is about to change jobs. When selecting a job, the person
evaluates the suggested salary and the prestige of the position. There are three choices: job
A, with the salary 65000$, but low prestige; job B, with the salary 58000$ and medium
prestige; and job C, with the salary 50000$ and high prestige. The person chooses A over
B because of the better salary, while a small difference in prestige, B over C because of the
same reason, and comparing C and A, the person prefers C because of the higher prestige,
although a lower salary. Thus one comes to the preference loop A > B > C > A.
Let us show how this problem can be resolved in QDT. Recall that the definition of the
behavioral probability (72) is contextual, in the sense that it depends on the initial conditions
for the decision state and on the given time. This means that the comparison of each pair of
alternatives constitutes a separate contextual choice, even if the external conditions remain
unchanged. The utility factors can be calculated as described in Sec. 8. Thus, considering
the pair A and B in the Fishburn example, we have the utility factors
f1(A) = 0.528 , f1(B) = 0.472 ,
where the label marks the moment of time t1 and an initial condition ρˆ1(t1) for the decision
state. Due to the close prestige of the both jobs, their attraction factors coincide, which, as
follows from the alternation law in Sec. 6, gives
q1(A) = q1(B) = 0 .
This leads to the behavioral probabilities
p1(A) = 0.528 , p1(B) = 0.472 .
Since p1(A) > p1(B), the job A at time t1 is stochastically preferred over B.
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Similarly, comparing the jobs B and C at time t2, we get the utility factors
f2(B) = 0.537 , f2(C) = 0.463 ,
and the attraction factors
q2(B) = q2(C) = 0 .
Hence the probabilities are
p2(B) = 0.537 , p2(C) = 0.463 ,
which implies that B at time t2 is stochastically preferred over C.
In the comparison of the jobs C and A at time t3, we find the utility factors
f3(C) = 0.435 , f3(A) = 0.565 .
Now the positions are of a very different quality, so that the attraction factors are
q3(C) =
1
4
, q3(A) = −
1
4
.
Therefore the probabilities become
p3(C) = 0.685 , p3(A) = 0.315 .
Then, at time t3, the job C is stochastically preferred over A.
However, we should not forget that these comparisons were accomplished at different
moments of time and under different initial conditions. Therefore there is nothing extraor-
dinary that differently defined probabilities can be intransitive. Even more, there are argu-
ments [121] that such intransitivities can be advantageous for alive beings in the presence of
irreducible noise during neural information processing.
The arising preference loops can be broken in two ways. First, the process of comparison
requires time during which there can appear additional information. The attraction factors,
as is explained in Secs. 9 and 10, vary with time, diminishing as time increases. When q3(C)
and q3(A) tend to zero then
p3(C) −→ f3(C) = 0.435 ,
p3(A) −→ f3(A) = 0.565 .
Since now p3(C) < p3(A), then A becomes preferred over C, hence the preference loop is
broken.
The other very natural way is as follows. As soon as there appears a preference loop,
this implies that decisions at different moments of time and under different contexts should
not be compared. One has to reconsider the whole problem at one given moment of time t.
Considering all three alternatives A,B,C in the frame of one given choice, we have
f(A) = 0.376 , f(B) = 0.335 , f(C) = 0.289 .
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The classification of the related qualities can be estimated according to the QDT rule
q(A) = −
1
4
, q(B) = 0 , q(C) =
1
4
.
Then we find
p(A) = 0.126 , p(B) = 0.335 , p(C) = 0.539 ,
which establishes the relation (A ≺ B ≺ C) between all alternatives, and no problems or
paradoxes arise.
13 Conclusion
The basic ideas of quantum decision theory are presented, with the emphasis on the prob-
lems of time evolution of decision processes. The relation between operationally testable
events and behavioral features of taking decisions are elucidated. The interplay of rational
and irrational sides of decision making is explained. The approach to describing quantum
intelligence networks is developed. As illustrations, several time inconsistencies are analyzed.
The main points of quantum decision theory are based on the techniques used in the
theory of quantum measurements. Therefore the presented approach can be employed for
characterizing evolutional processes in quantum measurements. The behaviour of many
self-organizing complex systems is similar to decision making [122], because of which the
approach could be useful in applications to complex systems and to the problems of artificial
intelligence.
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